(2020/5780)
One Friday night, I asked my sons to swerve out of range of a motion detector that would trigger a light when we passed by. While my sons happily complied (and even thanked me), one might wonder as to whether this was truly necessary. The answer depends on the resolution of a number of fundamental issues regarding Hilchot Shabbat. Rav Hershel Schachter addressed this issue in a Shiur he delivered at TABC in May 2005.
Unintentional Results - Davar She’Eino Mitkavein
Offhand, it would seem that this should be questionably permissible. After all, the dispute that rages between Rabi Shimon and Rabi Yehuda throughout Shas (such as in Beitzah 23b) as to whether a Davar She’Eino Mitkaven (an unintended action) is permitted is resolved in favor of the lenient view of Rabi Shimon (as already set forth by Rabi Yochanan, as is recorded in Beitzah 23b).
However, our case is not so simple; even Rabi Shimon would rule strictly in a case of Pesik Reisha, where it is inevitable that Melachah will result from one’s action (as stated many times in Shas, such as Shabbat 133a). Moreover, the result is desired (as the light makes it easier to walk), making it a Pesik Reisha DeNicha Lei, which is undoubtedly forbidden (and even constitutes a Torah level prohibition, as is clear from Rambam Hilchot Shabbat 1:6).
A Surprising Rashba
Nonetheless, there is a strong basis to be lenient. The Mishnah (Shabbat 106b) permits, as explained by Rashba (Shabbat 107a), closing a door on a house even though one thereby traps a deer inside the house. Rashba surprisingly explains that since one’s intention when closing the door is to protect the home (and not to trap the deer) no Melacha is violated despite the fact that one is aware that the deer is being trapped and that the result is inevitable.
Many Acharonim, including Teshuvot Avnei Neizer (Orach Chaim 194), Teshuvot Chelkat Yo’av (1 Orach Chaim 11), and Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yechaveh Da’at 5:29) explain that since one does not come in direct contact with the deer and does not intend to trap the deer, this renders the action as indirect (Gerama). The combination of the fact that it is an unintended act and is Gerama renders the act permissible. Gerama is not forbidden in a case of unintentional causation even in a case of Pesik Resha (as explained by the Even Ha’Ozer to Orach Chaim 328).
The approach of these Acharonim fits well with the Gemara (Shabbat 133a), which presents a special interpretation of the Torah to permit performing a Berit Milah in case one has Tzara’at at the place of the Milah. [1] Rav Yitzchak Taieb (Erech HaShulchan 316:2) and Teshuvot Sho’eil UMeishiv pose a question on Rashba based on this passage in the Gemara. Why, according to Rashba, is it necessary to have a Pasuk teach us that we may perform Milah if there is Tzara’at present? After all, Rashba permits an action where one’s intention is for the permitted activity (Milah) and the forbidden activity takes a proverbial back seat.
Based on these Acharonim, the answer is simple (as noted by Rav Ovadia Yosef in the aforementioned Teshuvot Yechaveh Da’at). Rashba’s principle does not suffice to permit such a Milah since one is performing the forbidden action directly. In the Milah case, one directly performs the forbidden act, unlike the case of closing the door, where one is not directly in contact with the deer.
Rav Schachter explains that Rashba’s approach fits with the Rambam (Hilchot Nizkei Mamon 4:2 as explained by the Maggid Mishneh ad loc.) who believes that intention often defines the difference as to whether something is defined as direct or indirect. The Rambam obligates one for damages caused by animals who escape due to his breaking the fence enclosing the animals only if one’s intention was for the animals to cause damage. [2]
Thus, according to Rashba, triggering an outdoor sensor light does not violate Shabbat. One’s intention is purely to walk on the street and although he is aware that he is triggering the sensor to turn on the light, no Shabbat violation occurs. He does not come into direct contact with the light and has no intention to turn on the light, and thus one has not transgressed in such circumstances.
Ran’s Dissent
However, Ran (Shabbat 38a in the pages of the Rif) strongly rejects Rashba’s thesis. He believes the conventional rules of Davar She’Eino Mitkavein and Pesik Resha apply in such a case. Ran believes that the case the Mishnah is speaking of is a situation wherein the person closing the door is not aware of a deer being trapped inside the house. The Maggid Mishneh (to Hilchot Shabbat 10:23) also subscribes to the view of Ran. Thus it would be forbidden, according to Ran and Maggid Mishneh, to trigger a sensor light, since one does benefit from the added light.
Rav Schachter’s Ruling
Rav Hershel Schachter stated that one should try his best to accommodate Ran’s stricter opinion and avoid triggering the sensor light. However, in case one cannot avoid an outdoor sensor light, one may rely on Rashba’s approach. [3] This ruling may also be followed by Sephardic Jews, as Rav Ovadia Yosef (in the aforementioned Teshuvot Yechaveh Da’at) adopts the same approach to a similar issue. [4] Thus, the Jachter men acted properly by moving out of the way of the sensor light which they might have otherwise triggered while walking home from Shabbat evening Tefillah.
We should clarify that it is possible that even Rashba would forbid triggering an indoor sensor light, such as one located in a stairwell in an apartment building. In such a case, it is often impossible to walk at night, and it seems that one’s intention in such a case is indeed to trigger the sensor light in order to make it possible to climb the stairs safely.
Detecting Hashem’s Hand in the Halachic Process
Let us reflect for a moment on this discussion. A most strange scenario presented in Gemara serves as a precedent to resolve a routine twenty-first century scenario. This is hardly an exceptional situation. We find this happening hundreds, if not thousands, of times in Halachic history.
Here are but a few examples: The Gemara (Sanhedrin 77a) speaks of releasing a dam of water and the rush of water killing someone tied up nearby. This serves as a precedent for permitting the opening of a refrigerator on Shabbat despite the fact that this might turn the motor on earlier than expected. Makkot 21a speaks of shaving with a pair of scissors, which serves as a precedent for the discussion of electric razors. Gittin 8b speaks of carrying a Kohein in a box above an impure location, which serves as the basis for the debate about a Kohen riding on an airplane that flies above a cemetery.
Gittin 66a speaks of a man trapped in a pit ordering the writing of a Get; this is a possible source that might permit a husband appointing an agent to execute a Get via videoconferencing. Chullin 70a speaks of transferring a fetus from one animal to another, which serves as the beginning of the discussion of the status of a baby born to a woman who received the egg from a donor.
A simple perusal of contemporary Halachic literature reveals many many similar examples. What are we to make of this phenomenon? I see this as an expression of Hashem’s hand in the Halachic process. How else is it that no matter the advance, Poskim invariably find a precedent in the Gemara?
What drove the Chazal to include such bizarre discussions that time after time emerge as crucial precedents for issues of major importance in our age of rapid technological development? I, for one, see no reasonable explanation other than the subtle hand of Hashem quietly guiding the sages of the Talmud to provide the raw material that enables the eternal Torah to retain its relevance and vitality in all circumstances and all generations.
[1] Recall that the Torah prohibits removing Tzara’at (Devarim 24:8).
[2] It is for this reason the Rambam (Hilchot Nizkei Mamon 4:1) excuses thieves who breach a fence to gain access to the enclosed area from the damages caused by animals that escaped through the breach. While the thieves must pay for the damage to the fence, they need not pay for the damage done by the animals, since their intention was not for the animals to escape.
[3] The Shulchan Aruch does not address the question as to whether the opinion of Rashba or Ran is accepted in practice. Interestingly, Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg (Techumin 25:441-449) explains that it is the Avnei Neizer’s explanation of Rashba that, in part, serves as the basis of his father-in-law Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach’s position permitting walking through Jerusalem’s Old City and the plaza of the Kotel HaMa’aravi, despite the ubiquitous presence of security cameras in the area.
[4] Moreover, since most of the sensors trigger non-incandescent lights, the underlying concern is merely Rabbinic. This is because the consensus Rabbinic opinion is that completing an electric circuit is merely a Rabbinic concern, when there is no heated filament involved (see Gray Matter 2, page 9, by the author). In such a case, Rav Ovadia in a number of Teshuvot (including the aforementioned responsum in Teshuvot Yechaveh Da’at) marshals as an added lenient consideration (Senif LeHakeil) the opinions that Pesik Reisha is not forbidden if the underlying prohibition is merely Rabbinic in nature (such as Rav Akiva Eiger, cited in Teshuvot Chatam Sofeir, Yoreh Dei’ah 140 and Rav Yizchak Taieb, Vavei HaAmudim 120:8). Even though the stricter view of the Magein Avraham (314:5) forbidding a Pesik Reisha even regarding a Rabbinic prohibition is the accepted view, we may utilize the lenient view in combination with Rashba’s opinion to be lenient in case of need.