2020/5780

I. Introduction

The study of Torah is, quite literally, a central pillar of the Jewish religion.[1] From a quantitative standpoint, the absence of any temporal or substantive limit to this Mitzvah, underscores its stature.[2] Study is deemed as of considerable contingent value, fostering and facilitating scrupulousness in general observance.[3] Of even greater import is its inestimable intrinsic significance, in both the normative[4] and experiential senses.[5] The privileging of study finds no small measure of justification on the metaphysical plane, where Torah is defined as both primordial[6] and all-encompassing.[7]

        Thus, the integral nature of Torah study at the Jewish plane firmly established, with concern both to its normative stature and spiritual impact, one must wonder what role, if any at all, Torah study has at the universal plane. It should be noted at the outset that if we are to speak of a prohibition of Torah study for the Gentile, it is axiomatic that we are speaking of a qualitatively different kind of prohibition than his prohibition to murder, commit an act of pagan worship, or blaspheme.[8] Certainly, these activities are all intrinsically morally and religiously repugnant, albeit in different ways, something which is unfathomable when considering the act of Torah study, by Jew or Gentile alike.[9] Instinctively, thus, when exploring the prohibition of Gentiles engaging in Torah study, we are likely to gravitate towards an interpretation which focuses on usurpation of the acme of Jewish spiritual life,[10] rather than an act which is of a fundamentally corrupt or evil nature.[11]

The question of Gentile study of the Torah may be posed on a number of levels, beginning with first-order questions concerning concrete norms, and expanding outward to secondary and even tertiary questions probing potential conceptual conclusions. One must ask, sequentially, at least the following questions: may a Gentile study the Torah at all? Is this act permissible yet neutral, permissible and encouraged, required, or prohibited outright? Does this depend, in turn, on the theological commitments of the Gentile in question? Alternatively, does it depend on the particular corpus being studied, or perhaps on the depth in which it is being mined? Might it even depend on the intent of the Gentile in question? Finally, might it depend on a combination of any number of these factors?

        Subsequently, one must turn to evaluate a number of questions, obviously contingent on the primary questions raised above concerning the permissibility of a Jew teaching Torah to a Gentile. Should one assume a prohibition for a Gentile to study the Torah, is there a distinct prohibition for a Jew to serve as his teacher?[1] If one starts with the opposite vantage point, assuming no free-standing prohibition for a Gentile to study the Torah, might there still be a prohibition for a Jew to serve as his instructor? Might this depend on one, or any combination, of the factors detailed above, including depth and intensity of study, the corpus being studied, the theological commitments or even the intent of the Gentile who has undertaken the quest?

Over the coming weeks, this series will attempt to engage the enumerated questions in the context of a broad inquiry into the standing of Torah study for Gentiles.

[1]       That is, over above the considerations of Lifnei Iveir. For a cursory overview of some of the issues concerning Lifnei Iveir at the universal sphere, see Avodah Zarah 6a-b, Rambam Hilchot Rotzei’ach 12:14-15, Seifer HaChinuch Kedoshim Mitzvah 232, and the Minchat Chinuch’s astonishment, ad loc.

[1]       See, for example, Avot 1:2, 1:15, 4:12, 6:2, 6:6, and especially, 1:9. Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai's formulation there, that the study of Torah represents the very telos of man's creation, is of particular importance in establishing the singular position of the institution of Torah study. See also Shabbat 88a, where Reish Lakish takes the matter one step further, arguing that the creation of the world itself, and not only of man, was for the sake of the revelation of Torah at Sinai. For the position of Talmud Torah relative to other prized activities, both in the axiological and pragmatic senses, see Pei’ah 1:1, Shabbat 127a, and especially Rambam Hilchot Talmud Torah, 3:1-8. With concern to the specific hierarchy between study and prayer, see Rava's astounding critique of Rav Hamnuna, as well as Rav Zeira's similar castigation of Rabi Yirmiyah, in Shabbat 10a, the germane distinction between those who fall under the category of Toratan Umanutan, Shabbat 11a, in addition to the Talmud's discussion of Rav Yehuda's regimen, Rosh HaShanah 35a, Rashi ad loc., and Ramban's conclusions, based in part on these sources, concerning the rabbinic nature of prayer in his Hasagot on Rambam's Seifer HaMitzvot, Mitzvah 5.

[2]       Pei’ah 1:1, apparently rooted in Joshua 1:8.  For a discussion concerning the controversial existence of a minimum requirement, see the relevant Talmudic passage, Menachot 99b, and the parallel discussion involving the same protagonists, Rabi Shimon Ben Yochai and Rabi Yishmael, adopting, prima facie, positions with the opposite orientation, Berachot 35b.

[3]       See Avot 6:1 for the catalytic relationship between study and action formulated in the affirmative, and ibid. 2:6 for the inverse, Hillel's observation of the unfortunate but inevitable impact which ignorance has on observance. The consequences of this contingency are far-reaching, and were analyzed by our Sages from a variety of perspectives; see Kiddushin 40b and Rambam Hilchot Talmud Torah 3:3 and 3:5. It should be noted that the catalytic relationship between study and action is not necessarily unidirectional, running from the former to the latter; in a certain sense, the opposite may also maintain. For two examples, see Rabi Chanina Ben Dosa's twin dicta, Avot 3:11-12. For a characteristically thoroughgoing overview of these issues as they appear in the locus classicus of Avot, see Rav Aharon Lichtenstein zt”l’s essay, 'Talmud and Maaseh in Pirkei Avot', Varieties of Jewish Experience, KTAV, 2011.

[4]       See, for example Avot, 6:1,3,5, and 7 for a litany of statements underscoring the intrinsic value of study for its own sake.

[5]       See Avot 3:3 and 3:7 for the important principle that Torah study is, ipso facto, a direct encounter with the Divine presence, providing an unparalleled spiritual, perhaps even ecstatic, experience.

[6]       Mishlei 8:22, as interpreted in Avot 6:10. See also the coda of Rabi Akiva’s triad, Avot 3:18.

[7]       Avot 5:26.

[8]       See Sanhedrin 56a-57b, Rambam Hilchot Melachim 9:2-4.

[9]       Much the same could be said regarding the question of a gentile who wishes to observe the Sabbath. It is indeed noteworthy that the Talmud discusses them in immediate proximity, Sanhedrin 58b-59a, and perhaps of even greater import that the Rambam integrates them into a single Halachah, Hilchot Melachim 10:9.

[10]     Usurping is plainly a general term, which itself may be conceptualized in a number of distinct ways. We will dwell on this point in the context of an analysis of the critical passage in Sanhedrin 59a.

[11]     The very fact that the activity of Torah study is permissible for a Jew itself, leaving aside both the fact that it is mandated, as well as its unparalleled status, may itself be sufficient to rule out the possibility that it could be defined as an intrinsic evil with respect to the gentile. Though it need not, perforce, be understood in this vein, it seems to me that this is implied by the Talmudic dictum, “Leka Mida’am DeLeYisrael Shari ULeNochri Assur,” “There is nothing which is prohibited to a Jew and yet forbidden to a non-Jew,” Sanhedrin 59a, c.f. Chullin 33a. Whilst the Tosafists, ibid, ruled that this was not germane to areas in which a Jew was not only permitted, but commanded, to perform the activity in question, such as Torah study or observing the Sabbath, the Tosafists may certainly agree that the very fact that a Jew is mandated to engage in these activities, by definition, preclude defining them as intrinsically objectionable when performed by a gentile. In any case, Lechem Mishneh, Hilchot Melachim 10:9, argues that Rambam, for one, extends the Leka Mida’am principle to areas in which the Jew has been mandated.