2024/5784

Much In Common 

Purim and Yom Yerushalayim share much in common. Both days celebrate Hashem redeeming us from a massive slaughter. The redemption in both cases involved a dramatic and extraordinarily abrupt shift – “V’Nahaphoch Hu.” Hashem solved the acute problem in both situations, but the chronic challenge remained (“Akati Avdei Achashverosh Anan,” Megillah 14a). Both are occasions for thanking Hashem for His intervention on our behalf. 

Interestingly, we learn from Megillat Esther how to detect Hashem’s hand in the Six-Day War.

Hashem’s “Fingerprints” in Megillat Esther 

Megillat Esther teaches us how to discover Hashem’s intervention at a time when He does not perform open miracles. Three means of detecting Hashem’s subtle “hand” are events happening against staggering odds, exquisite timing, and our enemies acting exceptionally foolishly (Vilna Gaon to Esther 1:2, 1:8, and 1:20).  

Examples abound for these three divine signals in Megillat Esther. What was the chance of Esther’s selection from amongst throngs of candidates from the Persian Empire? Examples of astounding timing include Mordechai being at the perfect time and place to foil Bigtan and Teresh’s plot to kill Achashverosh and how Achashverosh was reading about Mordechai’s exploits just as Haman was coming to request permission to kill Mordechai. Finally, Haman acts astonishingly foolishly when he visits Achashverosh’s palace at night, when he implies to Achasverosh that he wants to wear the king’s clothes and crown (and ride on his horse), and when he falls on Esther’s bed. Achashverosh selecting a queen about whom he does not know her nationality is also irrational. 

Hashem’s “Fingerprints” in the Six-Day War – Egypt 

There were a shocking number of shockingly imprudent enemy actions during the Six-Day War. The most well-known fiasco was the Egyptian air force leaving almost all its planes outside their hangars, fully exposed to Israeli attack, which the Israelis destroyed with relative ease at the beginning of the war. The elimination of the Egyptian air force dramatically turned the tide of the war in Israel’s favor. Dr. Michael Oren (Six Days of War, p. 171) records, “Though proposals for constructing concrete hangars had been submitted by the [Egytpian] air force and approved, none had ever been implemented.” 

On the first day of the war, as Israeli warplanes were on their way to destroy the Egyptian planes, the Jordanians (who possessed the most sophisticated radar facility in the Middle East) detected the Israeli attack and communicated the attack to the Egyptian defense minister. The Jordanian communication, however, was indecipherable since (Oren p. 172) “The Egyptians had changed their encoding frequencies the previous day, but without updating the Jordanians….But even if those messages could have been read, the Egyptian defense minister was not present to read them. He had gone to bed only a few hours before [the Israeli attack], leaving strict orders not to be disturbed. Similarly absent were the officers in charge of decoding and the air operations chief.…Air force intelligence also reported extensively on the Israeli attack. Still, the officers at the Supreme Headquarters….ignored them.”

Hashem’s “Fingerprints” in the Six-Day War – Jordan 

Dr. Oren (p. 244) writes that King Hussein of Jordan twice during the war ignored personal pleas from Israel’s Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to end the fighting. Hussein’s recalcitrance lost Jordan the entire West Bank. Oren (p. 185) explains that Hussein was led astray by Egyptian President Nasser, who lied to the Jordanian monarch and reported massive Israeli losses and the destruction of Israeli airfields. Hussein ignored reports from outside sources that, in reality, the Egyptian air force was annihilated (Oren p. 188). We should emphasize that King Hussein was a wise leader who ruled Jordan from 1953 until his natural death in 1999. Hussein shrewdly overcame many existential threats to Jordan and numerous assassination attempts. Israelis are fond of saying that King Hussein of Jordan made only two mistakes – attacking Israel in 1967 and refraining from invading Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War when Israel barely survived a two-front attack by Egypt and Syria. Israel, woefully unprepared for the 1973 war, likely would not have survived if Jordan had attacked during that terrible war.

Excellent timing worked in favor of the Israeli air force when it found Jordanian fighter planes on the ground refueling. As a result, the Israelis could eliminate the Jordanian air force within minutes on the first day of the war.

Hashem’s “Fingerprints” in the Six-Day War – Syria

The Syrian leadership also made stunning errors both before and after the war. An example is how the Syrians failed to recognize the damage done to them by Eli Cohen, a famous Israeli spy. Cohen worked in Syria, where he developed close relationships with the political and military hierarchy and became the Chief Adviser to the Minister of Defense. He was eventually exposed and executed in Syria in 1965. The intelligence he gathered is claimed to have been an important factor in Israel's success in the Six-Day War. His most famous achievement was when he toured the Golan Heights and collected intelligence on the Syrian fortifications there. Pretending to be concerned for the Syrian soldiers exposed to the sun, Cohen planted eucalyptus trees at every position. The Israeli military used the trees as targeting markers during the Six-Day War. It is particularly shocking that in the more than two years between the arrest of Eli Cohen and the Six-Day War, the Syrians did not recognize the problem the eucalyptus trees created for them and correct it.

During the war, the Syrians inexplicably retreated in many instances (although in certain areas, they offered fierce resistance). Oren (p. 295) records scenes where Israeli soldiers fired at Syrian tanks, and they turned out to have been abandoned. Oren writes:

“The Syrians were blowing up their own bunkers, burning documents, and retreating en masse. With their forward communications cut, unwilling to take charge at the front, Syrian commanders had lost all control over the battlefield. Yet even they were nonplussed when Radio Damascus broadcast that Quneitra (the Syrian headquarters on the Golan Heights) had fallen.”

The Soviet Union

One of Israel’s greatest fears was Soviet intervention when they launched their preemptive attack. While Israel could grapple with its neighbors, it was no match for the Soviet superpower. Moreover, the American government did not respond to an Israeli request for military assistance in the event of direct Soviet intervention in the war (Oren p. 299). Shockingly, this frightening scenario was resolved by a Soviet failure to assist Arab nations in any substantial manner in their fight against Israel, despite its allies’ dramatic losses. Oren (p. 296) explains that there was an internal dispute within the Soviet leadership as to whether to confront the United States in the Middle East. “That quarrel, together with the slow pace of Soviet decision making – the government met only once weekly, on Thursdays (the war began on Sunday) – had all but paralyzed Soviet diplomacy in the first days of the crisis.”

A Major Difference      

There is another similarity between Purim and Yom Yerushalayim. Chazal (Megilla 12a) teach that the Haman crisis was precipitated by our enjoying Achashverosh’s extreme and vile feast. In other words, we had assimilated way too much into Persian society. The three-day-fast corrected this mistake, and a Torah renaissance emerged after Haman was toppled and his extermination decree overcome. Our Torah revival culminated with a reacceptance of the Torah (Shabbat 88a explaining Esther 9:27).   

Similarly, our miraculous victory in 1967 spurred tens of thousands of Jews to return to Torah observance (my family included!). Perhaps this is why Hashem arranged for the Six-Day War to be followed so soon by Shavuot. It was the perfect time to reaccept the Torah as we did during Purim.  

Rav Norman Lamm made the following comments days after the end of the Six Day War: 

Even observant religious people usually possess an element of doubt within their faith. We use this doubt to excuse many of our transgressions, and we excuse the existence of this doubt by saying that had we lived in the age of the prophets or the age of miracles or the age of revelation, we would be sufficiently persuaded and convinced to be able to live according to the highest precepts of our faith, but that the absence of any such evidence justifies this seed of doubt. Were we exposed to the same wonders as was Israel of old, "and Israel saw the Egyptians dead at the shore of the sea,1' then we too would react as they did: "and they believed in-4the Lord and in His servant Moses (Ex.14:31). Such was the justification we offered ourselves for our doubt and our laxity heretofore. Now, we can no longer avail ourselves of that luxury. For we have seen, as did Jews in very special moments of history, ha-yad ha-gedolah, the "great Hand of the Almighty! Through electronic eyes and ears, each of us has been a personal witness to the great miracle, the great revelation of 1967.

In the decades following the Six Day War there has been a Torah resurgence. For example, there were only two Yeshivot Hesder before 1967 while today there are more than seventy. I doubt there were a thousand full-time Torah students before this war but today their number has increased a hundred-fold.  The Torah world has blossomed and flourished since 1967.

Conclusion – The Unfinished Mission

Nonetheless, the spiritual work of the Six-Day War remains unfinished. Our job as individuals and a community is to follow the path paved by our ancestors in the times of Megillat Esther. A great miracle demands a reaction on our part. A resurgence in our commitment to Torah must follow up a great miracle. Let us use the juxtaposition of Yom Yerushalayim and Shavu’ot to spur us to ignite, recharge, and deepen our Torah commitment.