(2017/5777)

This week, we conclude our discussion of the extent to which Halachah requires us to suffer in order to fulfill Mitzvot Asei (positive Mitzvot).   

The Twenty-Percent Maximum Expenditure to Fulfill a Mitzvah

The Gemara (Ketubot 50a) states that one is not allowed to donate more than one fifth of his assets to Tzedakah. The Rama[2] explains that this does not apply only to Tzedakah but to any Mitzvat Asei. Can we argue that if one may not use one fifth of his assets to perform a Mitzvat Asei, even more so he should not be allowed to fulfill a Mitzvah if doing so will harm his body? What if this specific person would be willing to pay a fifth of his assets to bypass the pain that would result from his performing the Mitzvah? May we extrapolate from this Halachah to our case of causing physical pain?

This question depends upon the precise nature of the twenty percent Petur (exemption). Is this Petur intended to prevent poverty amongst our people or is it because the Torah did not obligate a person to spend this exorbitant amount of money on a Mitzvat Asei? If we understand that the Petur is intended to prevent poverty, this exemption should not apply to exempting one who would experience physical pain as a result of fulfilling the Mitzvah. If, however, we understand the the Torah does not obligate a person to such an extent, it is very logical to say that this Petur applies to enduring significant physical pain.

Teshuvot BeTzeil HaChachmah[3] asserts that since the Torah limits us regarding the use of our assets, how much more so would it limit our obligations if they would cause physical pain! He concludes that one is excused from Mitzvot Asei if performing the Mitzvah would render him Nofeil LeMishkav (temporarily bedridden). Eishel Avraham[4] states that if most people would be willing to forego one fifth of their assets in order to avoid the pain caused by performance of the Mitzvah, they would be excused from the Mitzvat Asei. However, Rav Chaim Pinchas Scheinberg[5] presents a lengthy discussion where he seeks to prove that one cannot compare enduring physical pain to spending more than twenty percent of his assets.

An interesting case came before the Avnei Nezer involving a newborn baby boy with a serious problem with one of his legs. The doctor explained that he could probably save the child’s leg if he did surgery immediately, but if the surgery was done immediately, the child would not be able to receive a Brit Milah on his eighth day since birth. The doctor explained further that if he was to wait until after the eighth day to perform the surgery, the baby would certainly lose his leg. The question asked was whether surgery should be delayed in order to perform Milah on the eighth day. The Avnei Nezer answered, based on the Rama,1 that it is clear that in this case one is not required to lose so much (“Hon Rav”); if one is not obligated to expend twenty percent of his assets, of course he would not be obligated to sacrifice his limb.[6] We see that the Avnei Nezer applied the Petur of spending one fifth of one’s assets to a case of Sakanat Eiver (danger of loss of a limb), Category 2. It is unclear, though, whether the Avnei Nezer would apply this Petur to a less severe Category 4-level illness (Nafal LeMishkav).

Performing One Mitzvah Would Cause One to Miss Out on Other Mitzvot

What if performing a Mitzvat Asei would cause such physical pain that one may miss out on future Mitzvot? The Gemara[7] discusses the Torah source that teaches that we should violate Shabbat in order to save a life. The Gemara presents a number of explanations for this Halacha, including the opinion of Rabi Shimon Ben Menasyah: “Chaleil Shabbat Achat Kedei SheYishmor Shabbatot Harbei,” “violate one Shabbat in order that he may observe many future Shabbatot.” The Gemara concludes that the reason for violating Shabbat to save a life is the reason quoted by Shmuel: “VeChai BaHem, VeLo SheYamut BaHem,” “live for [Mitzvot], don’t die for them.” Although the Gemara does not accept Rabi Shimon’s explanation, the Rif, She’iltot, and Rambam all cite his principle in other contexts.[8] For instance, we derive from this principle that we are allowed to violate Shabbat in order to save a fetus[9] or to save someone from abandoning Judaism (the spiritual equivalent of mortal danger).[10] Rav Scheinberg suggests that perhaps this principle can be expanded to teach us to “Mechaleil Mitzvah Achat Kedei SheYishmor Mitzvot Harbei,” “abstain from performing one Mitzvah in order to be able to fulfill many other Mitzvot.” If performing a Mitzvah will, without a doubt, cause a person such pain as to prevent him to perform future Mitzvot Asei, he is clearly excused from the Mitzvah that will make him ill.[11] However, before applying this principle, one would have to weigh which Mitzvot he would be losing and which ones he would be gaining; perhaps losing a Mitzvat Asei SheYeish Bo Kareit such as fasting on Yom Kippur would trump many ordinary Mitzvot Asei.[12] It is also logical that there would be a difference between Mitzvot Asei that are DeOraita and DeRabanan.

Conclusion

We have outlined some of the parameters for situations in which a person would be excused from Mitzvot Asei that cause pain. It seems that when it comes to a Category 5 nuisance, all Poskim require such a person to perform the Mitzvat Asei (except for the individual Peturim of certain Mitzvot like Succah).

If one is faced with a Mitzvat Asei that would cause him to fall into a Category 4 type of illness (Nofeil LeMishkav), there is a dispute among the Poskim. The Binyan Shlomo and Tzitz Eliezer are lenient in applying the logic derived from Yom Kippur. Teshuvot BeTzeil HaChachmah adopts a lenient approach utilizing the logic derived from the use of twenty percent of one’s assets. Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank understood the Mishnah Berurah as teaching that such a person would be excused. However, the Maharam Schick and Rav Scheinberg say that you would have to put yourself into a Category 4 type of illness in order to perform a Mitzvat Asei. However, even according to the strict approach, if performing a Mitzvat Asei would cause one to be Nofeil LeMishkav, perhaps he would only be obligated if he is not losing the opportunity to fulfill many Mitzvot in the future. If, however, this pain would cause him to lose out on many future Mitzvot, he would be excused. Also, those who adopt the strict approach do not obligate a sick individual to perform a Mitzvah that requires eating if he would experience pain immediately after he eats. If this is the case, he would undoubtedly be excused since the Maharam Schick states that consumption in these circumstances is not defined as “eating.”

When one is faced with a Category 2 type of danger (danger to a limb), the Avnei Nezer excuses the sick individual based on the case of one fifth of one’s assets. Of course, those who adopt the lenient approach when it comes to Category 4 would be lenient as well in regards to Category 2. Even Rav Scheinberg admits that in such a case one would be excused.

Someone who has Celiac disease cannot eat gluten because if gluten is consumed, the gluten destroys the villi in the intestine, which may cause permanent damage. This also may cause illness in years to come. There are also many types of temporary reactions that different people who suffer from Celiac experience, which may be classified as either Category 4 or Category 5. Because of this more extreme case of damage to the intestines, it seems that we should classify this as Category 3. Those who permit Category 4, such as the Binyan Shlomo, Tzitz Eliezer, BeTzeil HaChochmah, and Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank, would presumably rule that such a person is excused. Even Rav Sheinberg seems to say that in a case like this where the person has a chronic condition he would be excused, because this is more similar to a case of Sakanat Eiver (danger to a limb).[13] In addition, if the Celiac patient would as a result miss fulfilling future Mitzvot, there would surely be more room to be lenient according to Rav Scheinberg’s approach. When contemporary Poskim were asked specifically about this case, whether a Celiac patient is required to eat wheat matzah, the Tzitz Eliezer,[14] Nishmat Avraham,[15] Rav Moshe Shternbach,[16] and Rav Gedalia Dov Schwartz,[17] rule that he would be excused.

However, it gets a little bit trickier once we start talking about someone who is gluten intolerant. Those with gluten sensitivity who consume grain do not damage their intestines in the same manner as patients with Celiac disease. These types of people may experience headaches, fatigue, abdominal pain, or other types of temporary pain. It is difficult to make a blanket Halachic statement regarding such people. Some may fall under Category 4 and would be subject to the Machloket discussed earlier. However, it is possible that they may only fall under Category 5 and therefore would be obligated.If we switch our discussion to someone who has serious difficulty with fasting, so much so that it would cause him to be sick for a week, what exactly would be the Halachah? This Mitzvah is even more stringent than eating Matzah because this is a Mitzvat Asei SheYeish Bo Kareit. Therefore the lenient ruling of the Binyan Shlomo and Tzitz Eliezer would not apply because that was limited to a case of an ordinary Mitzvat Asei. Also, one may not be able to apply the logic of abstaining from this Mitzvah now in order to perform many more Mitzvot in the future because this is a Mitzvat Asei SheYeish Bo Kareit and may outweigh other Mitzvot. Therefore, based on the sources we have explored, it is difficult to arrive at a conclusion for this situation.

It should be noted that the purpose of this article is to present the various sources and considerations when dealing with physical symptoms that hinder a person from performing Mitzvot. Needless to say, a Rav should be consulted for guidance on specific circumstances whenever one is faced with performing Mitzvot that cause pain.


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[1] Ibn Ezra himself develops such an idea, cf. his commentary to Shemot 19:20.

[2] Rama Yoreh Dei’ah 249:1

[3] Teshuvot BeTzeil HaChachmah 5:72

[4] Eishel Avraham (Butchach) Tinyana to Rama OC 656:1

[5] Halachah URefuah Vol. 4 pp. 131-133

[6] Teshuvot Avnei Nezer Yoreh Dei’ah 321

[7] Yoma 85

[8] Rif (Shabbos 65b), She’iltot She’iltah 1, and Rambam Hilchot Mamrim 2:4. The Netziv (to She’iltot 1:8) explains that the Gemara does not reject Rabi Shimon Ben Menasyah’s approach; rather, it simply informs us that we cannot it to justify violation of Shabbat, a case of possible danger to life.

[9] Ran (to Yoma 3b) quoting Ramban’s Torat HaAdam

[10] Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 306, Magen Avraham 306:29, Mishnah Berurah 306:47

[11] Rav Scheinberg Halachah U’Refu’ah Vol. 4 pp. 133

[12] Personal Conversation with Rav Yonason Sacks

[13] Rav Scheinberg in Halachah URefuah Vol. 4 pp. 134-135. This is how Rav Dovid Cohen in “Celiac: A Guide to Mitzvah Observance” (published in Chicago Rabbinical Council Journal 2010) understands Rav Scheinberg’s view. However it is unclear in Rav Scheinberg’s work whether someone with an existing chronic condition would be excused; it is possible that according to Rav Scheinberg, only someone who would acquire a new chronic condition from the performance of the Mitzvah would be exempted.

[14] Tzitz Eliezer 19:22 in his Teshuvah about those with Celiac.

[15] Nishmat Avraham Orach Chayim Siman 273:5 states that a Celiac patient’s obligation to eat Matzah is: “if he is unable to obtain oat-flour Matzah, and knows that he cannot tolerate even the slightest amount of gluten products without aggravating his condition, he is forbidden to eat regular Matza.”

[16] Halachah URefuah Vol. 4 pp. 147

[17] Cited by Rav Dovid Cohen in “Celiac: A Guide to Mitzvah Observance,” Chicago Rabbinical Council Journal 2010