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Superficial Torah Criticism

Critics argue that the Torah rejects the institution of democracy, thinking that since the Torah (Devarim 17:14-20) commands us to appoint a king, and the fact that a king ruled us for centuries, the Torah precludes the option of democracy. 

This critique, as is true with most arguments against the Torah, stems from a superficial understanding of the Torah. A more sophisticated examination reveals that democracy is a Torah option.

A Contradiction

The Torah does not clearly instruct us to appoint a king. Devarim 17:14 indicates that it is a Mitzvah to nominate a king only if we wish to do so. However, the next Pasuk states, “Som Tasim Alecha Melech,” “thou shalt surely appoint a king” (17:15), indicating an obligation to appoint a monarch. The Rishonim differ as to the resolution of this seeming contradiction.

Three Opinions of the Rishonim

Rambam (Hilchot Melachim 1:1) and Ramban (to Pasuk 14) understand that it is an obligation to appoint a king, based on Pasuk 15. 

Rav Sa’adia Gaon (to Pasuk 15) and Ibn Ezra (to Pasuk 15) argue that it is not an obligation. They understand that the Torah merely permits us to appoint a king, based on Pasuk 14.

Abarbanel (in his commentary to Devarim Perek 17 and Shmuel I Perek 8) argues that it is a horrible idea to have a king, but if we insist, then Hashem begrudgingly allows it.

Abarbanel bases his opinion on four points: 1) Shmuel HaNavi was infuriated when we asked for a king; 2) Abarbanel endured terrible experiences with corrupt kings in Portugal and Spain in his tenure as finance minister in these lands; 3) The Torah (Pasuk 14) presents appointing a king as mimicking a pagan practice, indicating its toxic nature; 4) Hashem imposes many restrictions on a king, limiting his wealth, army size, and marriages, and making him carry a Torah wherever he goes.

Abarbanel argues that these restrictions parallel the many restrictions imposed on a soldier considering marrying an Eishet Yefat To’ar, a beautiful captured woman (Devarim 21:10-14). The Torah presents many limitations on such a marriage to demotivate the soldier from creating such a union. Abarbanel understands the many restrictions regarding a king as intended to convince us not to appoint a king.

Compromise Approaches – Seforno and Netziv

Seforno argues that Pasuk 14 refers to a hereditary kingship. Such an arrangement is deeply problematic since the sole qualification of the king is his being the eldest son of the prior king. We see in Sefer Melachim that even the Davidic dynasty, which had many good or excellent kings, still had many “rotten apples,” such as Achaz, Menasheh, and Yehoyakim.

On the other hand, Seforno argues that Pasuk 15 refers to a king who rules for only one generation, such as the leaders of Sefer Shofetim. It is an obligation, in his opinion, to appoint such a leader so that we do not become like sheep without a shepherd (BeMidbar 27:17). Such a leader need not necessarily be a king; it could also be a democratically elected official because a nation with a democratically elected official is not unlike sheep without a shepherd.

Thus, according to Seforno, democracy is entirely compatible with the Torah.

Netziv develops this idea even further. He believes that there is a Mitzvah to appoint a king, as indicated by Pasuk 15. However, following Pasuk 14, he argues that there is a Mitzvah to nominate a king only if we want a monarchy. If we wish for another form of government, such as democracy, that is also acceptable. The king's authority comes from the people, so whatever government the people want is entirely satisfactory.

The Rav’s Explanation of Netziv’s Idea

The basis of Netziv’s approach is that the ruler's authority stems from the people. Pasuk 14 supports this idea as it conditions the appointment of a king on a nation’s willingness.

In a personal conversation, Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik told me that the Social Contract Theory - the notion that the ruler's authority stems from the people - fits with the Torah viewpoint. He noted that the Torah’s authority stems from us willingly accepting it, as recorded in Shemot 19. Rambam (in the introduction to his Mishneh Torah) similarly notes that the authority of the Talmud stems from its universal acceptance among the Jewish People

This idea was not just a theoretical approach for Rav Soloveitchik, as demonstrated by the following story. Once a community voted not to renew their rabbi's contract, and the rabbi came to Rav Soloveitchik for help. Rav Soloveitchik responded that he could not help him since a rabbi’s authority came from the people; the rabbi cannot force his authority on a community that no longer wants to employ him as its Rav (Nefesh HaRav page 267).  

Practical Application – Choice of a Rabbi

Every Jew should have a rabbi. Every couple needs a rabbi. Pirkei Avot 1:6 clearly states, “Asei Lecha Rav,” “Ensure that you have a rabbi.” Avot 1:16 adds, “appoint a Rav for yourself and remove yourself from doubt.” Based on Netziv’s insight, a Rav cannot impose his authority upon you; it is your choice as to whom to choose as a Rav. One might even choose multiple Rabbanim and bring different types of issues to each one. The option is yours. However, the bottom line is that a Jew without a Rav is like a sheep without a shepherd.

Conclusion

Not every modern-day concept is compatible with Torah thought. Moreover, just because the broader contemporary society accepts certain values as axiomatic, such as gender egalitarianism, it does not mean we must force such ideas into the Torah and Torah life.

However, the idea and basis of democracy are naturally compatible with Torah, without the need for forced or contrived interpretations and applications. While the Torah does not demand democracy, it is an option for a society that wants to conduct its government in such a matter.