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Overview: Between Tzelem Elokim and Kedushat Yisrael
The following is an introductory article in a five-part series dealing with the fundamental Halachic structures governing the universal sphere, Mitzvot Benei No’ach. It is axiomatic that such a series should begin with an article underscoring fundamental Halachic attitudes towards Benei No’ach, in general, as well as the different views represented in Chazal as to the actual substance of the Mitzvot Benei No’ach. The four succeeding sections will focus, respectively, on the institutions of Dinim and Tzedakah, Shabbat and Talmud Torah, Birkat HaSheim, and Eiver Min HaChai. Indeed, we shall come to see over the course of the series that the robust Halachic expectations of Benei No’ach are a direct product of the intrinsic and inalienable worth that Halachah perceived in all human life, without conceding, in any sense of the term, the significance and distinguishing features of Kedushat Yisrael.
The typically dialectical approach of Halachah to Geirut serves as a case in point. The simple fact that Tzelem Elokim may constitute a platform for Giyur, that is, the assumption of a more ambitious and intimate relationship with the Almighty, is itself a testament to the elevated and impressive status of Tzelem Elokim in its own right.
Furthermore, the very fact that such a transition, while deeply admired ex post facto, is not perceived, a priori, as a desideratum and, on the contrary, is actively discouraged[1] both reinforces the singularity of Kedushat Yisrael, on the one hand, while, on the other, affirms the legitimacy of choosing to remain at the plane of Tzelem Elokim. The validity of the status transcends even this world; “Chasidei Umot Ha’Olam Yeish Lahem Cheilek Li’Olam HaBa,”[2] “The righteous of the nations of the world have a portion in the world to come.”
Halakhic Perceptions of Benei No’ach: Tzelem Elokim, VeHalachata BiDerachav, and Yishuvo Shel Olam
“Chaviv Adam SheNivra BeTzelem,” “Beloved is man for he is created in [God’s] image.”[3] In this simple statement of Rabi Akiva, a worldview is contained. The foundational principle of Tzelem Elokim, bridging the world of interpersonal encounter with the Divine, is the starting point for any discussion of how Halachah related to universal man. It no doubt motivated the audacious and impassioned plea of our first Patriarch on behalf of the debased Sodomites, and, on a more sanguine note, served as the catalyst for the personal greetings extended to the ‘gentile in the marketplace’ by no less a figure than Rabi Yochanan Ben Zakkai.[4]
Moreover, the Almighty’s investment in each and every human being, as classically detailed in both the culminating verse of Sefer Yonah, or as inimitably expressed in the Talmudic passage regarding the silencing of the celestial angels at Yam Suf, “Ma’aseh Yadai Tovin BaYam Ve’Atem Omerim Shira,” “My handiwork is drowning in the sea, and you are saying praise?”[5] reflexively triggers the Torah principle of VeHalachta BiDerachav[6] with respect to humane treatment of gentiles.
Rambam’s reformulation[7] of the Talmudic requirement[8] to provide humane treatment even to idolaters on the basis of Darchei Shalom as a matter of imitatio dei is perhaps the most celebrated Halachic expression of this phenomenon, and justly so. If caritas on the universal sphere, including providing for the indigent, visiting the sick, burying of the dead, and, according to Shulchan Aruch, comforting the mourners is a matter of Rabbinic obligation, Rambam felt that the Kiyyum (fulfillment) was clearly on the Torah level.
If the warp and weft of behavior between the Jew at the universal sphere are, to be sure, the reality of Tzelem Elokim and the mandate of VeHalachata BiDerachav, then the completed tapestry would surely include partnership between Jew and gentile in all matters concerning advancement of humanity at large, defined, in Halachic terms, as Yishuvo Shel Olam.
Indeed, this was precisely the approach advocated by the Rav in his seminal essay Confrontation, as he fiercely advocated the need for meaningful partnership in this realm, even as he categorically proscribed and rejected interfaith dialogue of any sort. As was so often the case, the Rav affirmed, in the most eloquent terms, principles that had already been clearly established by Chazal.
After all, as indicated in two separate locations in the Talmud,[9] the principle recorded by Yeshayahu HaNavi, “Lo Tohu Vera’ah LaShevet Yetzarah”, “He did not create it to be void; to be habituated He made it,”[10] maintains at the universal plane. Even Reish Lakish, who rejects the proposition in those passages that children had prior to conversion might represent a fulfillment of Periyah U’Reviyah, on the basis of Geir SheNitgayer KiKattan HaNolad Dami, does not dispute the basic universal obligation to populate and cultivate the world.
Mitzvot Benei No’ach: Constituent Parts and the Whole
While the existence of ‘Sheva Mitzvot Benei No’ach’ is a truism of sorts, even a cursory examination of the Talmudic evidence immediately complicates the discussion.For starters, even if we were to assume the existence of such a list of seven, we would immediately have to introduce two caveats: any such list would exclude affirmative obligations[11], as opposed to prohibitions; second, the content of a list of prohibitions is itself subject to dispute.
In particular, the more common formulation of seven- idolatry, blasphemy, murder, theft, adultery, Dinim, and consumption of a living animal- is disputed by Tanna DiVei Menashe,[12] who excludes both Dinim and blasphemy and includes, in their stead, castration and illicit hybrids. Furthermore, the Talmud records views which are broader in scope than the commonly accepted list of seven. Conversely, it is striking to note that no fewer than three[13] Tanna’im support the position that Adam HaRishon[14] was bound by no more than three Mitzvot, namely idolatry, blasphemy, and Dinim.
Rambam, however, does assume, though somewhat tentatively,[15] that the list of seven Noahide laws is normative, with the first six- idolatry, blasphemy, murder, sexual immorality, theft, Dinim- having been commanded to Adam HaRishon, and the seventh, consumption from a living animal, having been commanded to No’ach.
In this particular passage in Rambam, it is fascinating to note that after mentioning the ten-generation gap between the first six commandments issued at the universal plane and the seventh, Rambam writes, “Nimtze’u Sheva Mitzvot,””Thus, they are found to be seven commandments.” If we can presume Rambam was not teaching us that the sum of six and one is in fact seven, then it seems most reasonable to assume that Rambam was conveying that these seven Mitzvot constitute a discrete unit.
This reading appears to be confirmed by the very next line in Rambam, in which he writes, “VeChein Hayah HaDavar BeChol Ha’Olam Ad Avraham,” “And so the (singular) matter was in the entire world until the days of Avraham,” indicating the commencement of the particularist phase of commandment to what would one day be Knesset Yisrael, beginning with the signature mitzvah of Milah.[16]
It is our aim in the next four parts of this series to maintain the line just before the emergence of he whom Rambam would term, in another locale, “Amudo Shel Olam,” “The pillar of the world,”[17] and concern ourselves with Divine expectations, and opportunities, which persist at the universal plane. As indicated by Rambam’s language of “Nimtze’u Sheva Mitzvot,” the whole, it would appear, is far more than the sum of the constituent parts.
[1] See Yevamot 47a, Rambam Issurei Bi’ah 13:14, Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Dei’ah 268:2.
[2] Rambam Hilchot Teshuvah 3:5.
[3] Avot 3:18.
[4] See Berachot 17a.
[5] Megillah 10b.
[6] See Rambam Sefer HaMitzvot 8.
[7] Rambam Hilchot Melachim 10:12. The critical advancement of Rambam, beyond the Gemara, was to cite the verse, “Tov Hashem LaKol VeRachamav Al Kol Ma’asav,” “Hashem is good to all, and His compassion is upon all of His handiwork,” (Tehillim 145:9), which makes it quite clear that our obligation to extend these kindnesses to gentiles is not merely a matter of avoiding friction, but a Kiyum De’Oraita of the Mitzvah of imitatio dei.
[8] Gittin 61a.
[9] See Yevamot 62a and Bechorot 47a. The Shulchan Aruch (Even Ha’Ezer 1:7) rules in accordance with Rabi Yochanan, as understood by Rambam (Hilchot Ishut 15:6), that the children converted as well as the father. It should be noted that this is certainly not the only way of understanding the Gemara, and appears to be disputed by Tosafot (Yevamot 62a s.v. Rabi Yochanan).
[10] Yeshayahu 45:18.
[11] See Sanhedrin 58b.
[12] See Sanhedrin 56b.
[13] ibid.
[14] See Tosafot (Sanhedrin 56b s.v. Lo Nitztaveh Ela Al Avodah Zarah), who explain that the fruit of the Eitz HaDa’at (as well as the restriction against eating meat) are not enumerated on account of their being temporary in nature.
[15] See Hilchot Melachim 9:1, with the somewhat hesitant formulation, “MiKelal Divrei Torah Yeira’eh She’Al Eilu Nitztavu,””From all of the matters of Torah, it seems that they were commanded upon these.”
[16] The fact that Milah is the ‘boundary mitzvah’ between the Sheva Mitzvot Bnei No’ach and Taryag is deeply compelling. Milah, after all, represents the personal entry into Knesset Yisrael, whether by birth or during gi’ur. The identification of the term “Areil” with those outside of the fraternity, even if they happen to possess a circumcision, as well as the Halachic veracity of the converse proposition, that a Jew who lacks Milah is still not included in the term “Areil”, for purposes of vows, is of profound significance. See Nedarim 31b on the basis of Yirmiyahu 9:25. See also Ramban’s rejoinder to Rashi on Shemot 12:45, with respect to the prohibition “Toshav VeSachir Lo Yochal Bo.”
[17] See Rambam Hilchot Avodat Kochavim UMazalot, Chapter 1.