5784/2024

Ne’emanut vs. Chashud

The Torah (Devarim 19:15) requires two witnesses regarding monetary and criminal matters. Two witnesses are also necessary regarding changes in personal status (Ein Davar SheBe’Erva Pachot Mishnayim, Kiddushin 66a). Yet, “Eid Echad Ne’eman Be’Issurim, one witness suffices for ritual matters” (Gittin 2b) is a cardinal principle for a kosher kitchen. 

However, the Torah limits this Ne’emanut (trustworthiness) to an observant Jew. The Mishna (Bechorot 35b) states that HaChashud Badavar Lo Dan VeLo Me’ido, one who does not uphold a Torah law is not believed concerning that matter. The Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 119:1) thus rules that one cannot trust the kashrut of someone who does not observe these Halachot.  

This rule makes great sense. If someone does not take Kashrut seriously, why should he care more about the kosher observance of another person than his own? Additionally, many such individuals are not even aware of many of the rules of kashrut since they do not regularly observe them. 

Knowledge vs. Ne’emanut 

However, Rav Moshe Feinstein, in a landmark Teshuvah (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:54), sets forth an exception to the rule. Rav Moshe recounts that when he visited Moscow in 1934, elderly Jews posed a most vexing challenge. They were being hosted by their non-observant children and had nowhere else to live. They were too feeble to prepare their food and were entirely dependent on their children. Rav Moshe was asked if there was any way to justify the parents’ eating the cooked food their children served them. 

Rav Feinstein responds that if the parents are convinced of their children’s honesty and integrity, based on their extensive experience with them, they may rely on their children’s assurances that the food they serve their parents is Kosher. Such an assessment is arrived at by parents’ repeated experience of their children’s honesty.  

Although even the most honest of non-observant children do not enjoy Ne’emanut, their parents have Yedi’ah, first-hand knowledge and understanding of their children’s character and behavior. Yedi’ah, Rav Moshe asserts, is the equivalent of Ne’emanut. Halachah grants Ne’emanut to the ritual-based testimony of an observant Jew, even if one cannot assess his positive character. However, first-hand knowledge of the person’s honesty based on extensive experience provides the necessary support to rely on their word. 

Rav Feinstein proves his point from an incident recorded in Ketubot 85a:

There was a certain woman who was obligated to take an oath in order to avoid payment in Rava’s court. The daughter of Rav Ḥisda said to Rava, her husband: I know that she is suspect with regard to taking a false oath. Rava reversed the obligation of the oath so that it fell onto the other party, who now had the option of taking an oath that the woman owes him money and collecting his debt. This is how to act when the court does not trust the one who is obligated to take an oath (mehpachin shevu’ah akenegdo).

Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: And should Rav Pappa not be trusted like Rav Ḥisda’s daughter, who as a woman is disqualified from testimony? Rava replied: I relied on Rav Ḥisda’s daughter because I know with certainty about her that she is always truthful. However, I cannot rely on the Master because I do not know with the same degree of certainty about him that he is always truthful, and I cannot rule on the basis of one witness unless I have complete certainty.

Although Rava’s wife/Rav Chisda’s daughter is not a valid witness, her husband Rava’s experience fully convinced him of her reliability (Kim Li BeGava). Therefore, he accepted her testimony. Similarly, if the parents are completely confident of their daughter or daughter-in-law’s honesty based on experience, they may rely on her assurance she is serving kosher food. However, Rav Feinstein limits his permission to a case of exceptional need (Sha’at HaDechak).  

Limitation to Cases of Great Need

In a masterful Teshuvah, Rav Mendel Senderovic (Teshuvot Atzei Besamim Y.D. 10) provides a thorough and in-depth analysis of Rav Moshe’s Teshuvah. Rav Senderovic deals with a thankfully common scenario. Teenagers becoming Torah observant often depend on their non-observant parents to provide them with food. They question whether they may rely on their nonobservant parents’ assurances they are serving Kosher food on kosher equipment. Rav Senderovic begins his discussion by presenting two reasons why Rav Feinstein limited his ruling to cases of exceptional need. 

First, the Maharik (Teshuvot number 82) and Maharam Alashkar (Teshuvot number 119) argue about the experience necessary to assert Kim li BeGava. The Maharik only requires one extensive interaction to assess the person as honest. However, the Maharam Alashkar demands that one has seen the person suffer great loss and stress he could have avoided if he lied. Rav Moshe follows the Maharik.  

Second, the Rif (Ketubot 43b in the pages of the Rif, citing the Geonim), the Rambam (Hilchot Sanhedrin 24:1-2), and Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 15:5) write that we longer enjoy the authority to invoke Kim Li BeGava. Rav Moshe argues that this limitation applies only to monetary disputes. However, regarding ritual matters (Issurim), it pertains even nowadays. 

Rav Senderovic, though, notes that the Beit Meir in a Teshuva to Rabi Akiva Eiger (Teshuvot 1:100) writes that Kim Li BeGava may not be invoked even regarding Issurim. 

A simpler explanation for Rav Feinstein’s limitation is that the Shulchan Aruch devotes an entire chapter (Y.D. 119) to outlining who we believe regarding Kashrut. Nowhere in this section does the Shulchan Aruch or any of its commentaries set forth an exception for someone regarding whom we can say Kim Li BeGava. Thus, Rav Moshe’s lenient stance is quite a chiddush (novel idea) and should be utilized only in genuinely extenuating circumstances. 

Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Teshuvot VeHanhagot 2:43) rejects Rav Feinstein’s bold ruling, arguing that we cannot extrapolate from Ketubot 85a, which dealt with monetary matters to other areas of Halachah. Rav Shternbuch’s dismissal of Rav Feinstein’s leniency is quite noteworthy in light of Rav Shternbuch’s pronounced leniency regarding Baalei Teshuva’s needs. 

However, Rav Asher Weiss (Teshuvot Minchat Asher 2:49 and Parashah Shiur, Parashat Toledot 5778) supports Rav Moshe’s ruling. Most interestingly, Rav Asher notes that Rav Moshe’s Teshuvah explains how Yitzchak Avinu ate the meat Eisav provided him (Breishit 25:28 with Onkelos)! However, Rav Weiss limits his approval to a Sha’at haDechak, like Rav Feinstein.  

Very significantly, Rav Weiss also notes that the dispute between Rav Feinstein and Rav Sternbuch already arose between the Rivash and his Talmid, the Tashbetz (Teshuvot Tashbetz 2:21 and 3:83).  

Transferring Forward Kim Li BeGava 

Even according to Rav Feinstein, it is highly questionable if one who trusts his parents from experience may transfer this knowledge. For example, if a Ba’al teshuva relies on his parents due to Kim Li BeGava, may his or her spouse rely on his assessment? The Chatam Sofer (Teshuvot 2: Y.D. 115, cited by the Pitchei Teshuva Y.D. 65:5) rejects extending Kim Li BeGava, based on the Shitah Mekubetzet’s interpretation of an incident recorded in Beitza 14b:  

The Gemara relates: Rav Pappi happened to come on a Festival to the house of Mar Shmuel. He brought to him porridge, made from wheat groats, but he did not eat it, out of concern that the wheat might have been pounded on the same day. The Gemara asks: And perhaps they performed the pounding with a small mortar and pestle, in a permitted manner? The Gemara answers: This cannot be the case, as he observed that it was well ground, which cannot be achieved by means of a small mortar and pestle. The Gemara asks: And perhaps they prepared it the day before, on the Festival eve? The Gemara answers: This cannot be the case, as he observed that the husks of the groats were bright, an indication that they had been prepared recently. And if you wish, say instead that he refrained from eating for another reason, because the house of Mar Shmuel is different, as he had slaves, and slaves are lax with regard to prohibitions. Therefore, Mar Shmuel ought to have prohibited all forms of grinding in his house, to ensure that no one grinds anything in an inappropriate manner.

The Shitah Mekubetzet wonders if the slaves were lax, how did Mar Shmuel partake of the food. He answers that Mar Shmuel knew them well and recognized their reliability for Kashrut. The Chatam Sofer concludes that Rav Pappi, on the other hand, refused to enjoy the food because Mar Shmuel’s Kim Li BeGava could not be transmitted to Rav Pappi. However, the Chatam Sofer expresses surprise at the inability to transfer credibility and regards it as a Chiddush.

In a dramatic move, Rav Senderovic notes that the Shitah Mekubetzet seems to be quoting from the Ritva. However, the Ritva adds a crucial point not indicated by the Chatam Sofer. The Ritva writes that Rav Papi refrained Lefnim Meshurat HaDin, beyond baseline Halachic requirements. Thus, according to the Ritva, basic Halacha permits transferring credibility! It is possible that had the Chatam Sofer seen the Ritva (which seems not to have been available to him), he would have permitted moving trustworthiness from one person to another. After all, the Chatam Sofer thought of its restriction as a Chiddush.

Moreover, Rav Feinstein writes, “There is room to permit others to eat the food cooked for the parents.” Although Rav Moshe retreats from this possibility in the Teshuvah’s concluding paragraph, in Teshuvot Igrot Moshe E.H. 4:12, he permits transferring a personal assessment of trust to a spouse. Moreover, in Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 2:43, he considers the widespread transfer of personal trust but only rejects it because he feels the assessment was inadequate.  

Conclusion

American Rabbanim commonly follow Rav Moshe and Rav Weiss permitting Baalei Teshuva children to rely on their non-observant parents’ kashrut in many circumstances. However, we must not lose sight of this being an extraordinary leniency, not to be followed except in extenuating circumstances and with specific rabbinic guidance. Rav Senderovic correctly notes that trying to avoid an uncomfortable feeling when not eating a non-observant Jew’s food does not justify relying on this great leniency.