(2012/5772)
One of the opening sections of Mishpatim (Shemot 21:7-11) deals with a father who sells his daughter into bondage. While this may at first seem unfair and even inhumane, the idea is not totally foreign to Jewish law. One of the five things Rabbi Yehudah Ben Bava testified about is that we encourage Mi’un (literally, denial) among girls. This case deals with a girl who was betrothed by her father before she was twelve years old. In fact, if the father dies, then the girl’s mother, or even brother, can do the betrothal. When the girl reaches age twelve she has the right to reject (be Mema’ein) the Kiddushin preformed by her mother or brother, but not father. We see from here that a father has far extending powers over his minor daughter.
The case presented in Mishpatim deals with not with Kiddushin, but rather with bondage, although we will see that the two are fundamentally linked. The Pasuk states, “VeChi Yimkor Ish Et Bito LeAmah Lo Teitzei . . .” “If a man will sell his daughter as a bondswoman, she shall not leave . . .” (Shemot 21:7). A girl who is bought because her father sells her does not leave when other slaves would, whether for Yoveil or the seventh year after she is bought. She instead remains indefinitely in service to her master. But there is more: “Im Ra’ah BeEinei Adoneha Asher Lo Yeadah VeHefdah LeAm Nochri . . . BeVigdo Vah” “If she is displeasing in the eyes of her master, who should have designated her for himself, he shall assist in her redemption . . . for he had betrayed her.” (Shemot 21:8). Chazal derive from this Pasuk two very important things. The first is that when the master assists in the “redemption,” part of the monetary calculation is how many years she has worked for him. In fact, he must subtract her would-have-been wages from the final amount for which she is redeemed. This would clearly imply that for the time she was in service she was not—at least not fully—a slave. After all, she “earned” wages. This also seems similar to what the Sages (Sanhedrin 91a) tell us about the wealth we took upon our exit from Egypt. We are told that the gold and silver and animals are all in payment for the service we worked in Egypt. This idea leads directly into the second thing Chazal learn from the Pasuk: the sale of the girl is done with the sole purpose of creating a marriage. If the master does not “designate,” i.e. betroth, her to himself or his son, he has “betrayed” her. It would seem that this case is no different from the case of outright betrothal, and yet we see that the girl is still in some form of bondage before either betrothal or release. Nevertheless, upon being “betrayed” she is set free.
The escape clauses built into the case of bondage as well as by Mi’un illustrate an underlying theme surrounding the beginning of Parashat Mishpatim: to care for those in our control. A girl who reaches bat mitzvah can reject the forced Kiddushin of a mother or brother if she objects. A girl must be provided for and have a future set for her by her master. If not, she, a mere slave, has been “betrayed” by her master, who should have absolute control of her, and is set free. Much of the beginning of this Parashah is taken up by other aspects of slave owning, and yet the Sages (Kiddushin 20a) tell us someone who has but one pillow must give it to his slave. If a master hurts or damages his slave, the slave’s service is immediately terminated. Furthermore, no Eved Ivri remains in bondage longer than the next Yoveil without choice. We see that although people can clearly become property, the two are not mutually exclusive. An Eved is still a person and protected under basic rights of humanity. The same applies to the girl who is sold; if her future is not provided for, she is released to find a different path. These practices have all but vanished from the world at large, and yet there is an important message to found: no matter how lowly someone is—no matter how much power you hold over someone—they are still someone, a fellow human being who shares all the rights that you have.